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DISCLOSURE FOR CLOSURE? WHY THE SELF-REFERRAL 
DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL PROCESS PAIRED WITH THE 60-DAY 
OVERPAYMENT RULE CREATES MORE HEADACHES THAN 
SOLUTIONS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of health care includes many dates that cannot be ignored. The 
institution of Medicare in 1965, the passage of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996, and the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) in 2010. Each law transformed the health care landscape, 
posing questions to be answered and presenting problems to be solved. Each 
act hoped to change health care for the better and each made health care more 
complicated. Those complications have increased the need for health care 
compliance departments and legal counsel. 
Much of a health care compliance department’s focus is on prevention of 
regulatory violations. Those violations vary from HIPAA privacy violations, 
antitrust agreement violations, or physician self-referral violations. The 
avenues through which providers disclosed violations prior to the passage of 
the ACA were overlapping and convoluted.1 The Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have disclosure protocols; however, providers 
were not always confident which agency to report to. The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) issue advisory opinions on various violations, 
most prevalently Stark Law violations, adding one more avenue for providers 
to contemplate.2 Providers submit details of a potentially law-violating 
situation looking for an advisory opinion response on whether it is a violation 
and to seek a settlement agreement. Prior to understanding the disclosure 
process, it is important to understand the nature of the violations themselves. 
Since 2009, three important laws passed, dramatically impacting how 
providers disclose various violations.3 This paper will argue that the three laws 
passed, as they stand, impose unreasonably difficult standards on providers to 
 
 1. Stephen Chananie et al., Disclosing and Refunding Overpayments in Healthcare Cases, 
HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2012, at 16, 16. 
 2. 42 C.F.R. § 411.370(b) (2013). 
 3. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 6409(a)(1), 
(b), 6402, 124 Stat. 772 (2010); Medicare Program; Reporting and Returning of 
Overpayments, 77 Fed. Reg. 9179, 9187 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed 
Rule]. 
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return and disclose overpayments and violations. Section II will describe the 
needed background to understand how and why the laws were passed. Section 
III will navigate, from a provider’s perspective, the various difficult decisions 
and legal challenges faced when addressing an actual or potential Stark Law 
violation. It will begin with characterization of the violation, and address the 
disclosure process, determining potential liabilities and the benefits and risks 
involved in utilizing the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP). Section IV 
will further analyze the interaction of the three laws and provide a solution that 
is best suited for both providers and government actors. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Health care providers have many laws and regulations to navigate in order 
to operate a successful practice or hospital. Before addressing the issues in the 
event of an actual or potential violation, it is necessary to understand the 
history of the violations and how and why they were passed. This section will 
begin with the most prevalent fraud and abuse laws and move toward the more 
recent laws that have presented the legal issue posed in this paper. 
A. History of the Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute 
The government discovered many years ago that physicians could 
potentially take advantage of or abuse the Medicare payment system for their 
own financial gain. The financial gain came in forms such as compensation 
from a hospital to a doctor for referring a patient to that hospital, from a device 
manufacturer to a physician for influencing the use of a particular product, or 
by a physician referring a test or service to an entity the provider owns. 
Congress saw the potential for abuse in these relationships and the effects of 
the abuse such as providers not putting the Medicare beneficiaries’ interests 
first. Initially, Congress passed the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) to combat 
these inappropriate relationships. However, the AKS was not broad enough to 
combat all fraud and abuse and led to the subsequent passage of the Stark 
Law.4 
In 1972, Congress passed the AKS,5 which imposes criminal and civil 
penalties on anyone who knowingly and willfully receives or pays anything of 
value to influence the referral of federal health care program business.6 Such a 
violation can result in a felony conviction with violations punishable by up to 
five years in prison, criminal fines of $25,000, civil monetary penalties up to 
$50,000, and exclusion from participation in federal health care programs, such 
 
 4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012). 
 5. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242, 86 Stat. 1329, 1419. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). 
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as Medicare and Medicaid.7 While the rule is hard and fast, it contains a 
number of safe harbors that make particular arrangements, which on their face 
violate the law, legal.8 
In spite of the AKS, in the late 1980s, a series of reports to Congress 
showed that higher utilization of various medical services occurred when 
physicians had a financial interest in those services.9 Not enough intentional 
receiving or paying of value occurred to impose criminal penalties, but the 
business arrangements did not feel right. Physicians received both direct and 
indirect value for referring services for patients to entities with whom they had 
a financial relationship. Following the studies, Congress enacted the Federal 
Physician Self-Referral Statute,10 also known as the Ethics in Patient Referrals 
Act, or most commonly the “Stark Law.”11 
The Stark Law passed in two phases, the first effective in 1992 (“Stark I”) 
followed by the second in 1995 (“Stark II”).12 Stark I focused mostly on the 
financial relationship between physicians and clinical laboratories while Stark 
II extended to eleven designated health services (DHS). The wide array of 
DHS include clinical laboratory services, physical therapy services, 
occupational therapy, speech pathology, radiology and imaging services, 
radiation therapy services, durable medical equipment, parenteral and enteral 
nutrients and equipment, prosthetics and orthotics, home health services, 
prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospital services.13 
The statute made it illegal for a physician to refer DHS to an entity if the 
physician or someone related to the physician has a financial interest in the 
entity, and Medicare would typically make payment to the entity for the DHS. 
The result was various penalties at CMS’ discretion including, but not limited 
to, civil monetary penalties or exclusion from the Medicare program.14 No 
penalty would occur if the physician or entity complied with one of the many 
exceptions included in the law. 
The Stark Law’s broad nature left many questions unanswered. CMS 
published regulations addressing the new coverage under Stark II in three 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B), (2)(B). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(3). 
 9. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. OAI-12–
88– 01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE 
BUSINESSES ii-iii (1989). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (2012). 
 11. Called the Stark Law because its primary sponsor was Congressman Fortney “Pete” 
Stark (D-CA), the law aimed at removing the financial incentive of physicians in making 
medical decisions. See Andrew B. Wachler & Adrienne Dresevic, Stark II Phase III – “The 
Full Picture”, HEALTH LAW., Sept. 2007, at 1, 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6). 
 14. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
192 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:189 
separate phases beginning in 200115 and ending in 2007.16 The phases sought 
to clarify many of the uncertainties in the original law. Each of the phases 
introduced new definitions, explaining what various terms in the law meant, 
and added new regulatory exceptions as the Secretary of HHS deemed fit. The 
law, upon completion of the final phase, became a living creature molding and 
conforming to various market and political pressures. 
B. Provider Voluntary Self-Disclosure Process and the New Self-Referral 
Disclosure Protocol 
When a Stark Law violation exists, providers are expected to disclose the 
violation to CMS and either repay the money with the possibility of penalties, 
lose future access to Medicare Participation, or reach a settlement for less than 
the amount owed.17 Many issues arose throughout the early disclosure process, 
particularly with the OIG’s Self-Disclosure Protocol.18 Specifically, the OIG 
required disclosures to be for “knowing violations.”19 This alienated some 
violators because they were reporting solely Stark Law violations, which is a 
strict liability statute, resulting in many unknowingly committed Stark Law 
violations. Providers sought to resolve their uncertainty in an inefficient way: 
by seeking advisory opinions and submitting settlements directly to the DOJ.20 
In response to the underdeveloped resolution process for Stark Law 
violations offered by the government, Congress created the SRPD in Section 
6409 of the ACA.21 In creating the SRDP, Congress authorized HHS to create 
a disclosure process, separate from advisory opinions and the existing Self-
Disclosure Protocol with the OIG, to resolve Stark Law violations.22 The 
SRDP authorizes HHS, and consequently CMS, to reduce amounts owed to the 
government based on a variety of factors.23 Additionally, CMS is required to 
 
 15. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With 
Which They Have Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001); Medicare Program; 
Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships 
(Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 16. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors for 
Certain Electronic Prescribing and Electronic Health Records Arrangements Under the 
Anti-Kickback Statute, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,110 (Aug. 8, 2006). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g). 
 18. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 19. 
 19. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S, UPDATED PROVIDER 
SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter OIG PROTOCOL], available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info/files/Provider-Self-Disclosure-Protocol.pdf. 
 20. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 20. 
 21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6409(a)(1), (b) 
(2010). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Factors include (1) the nature and extent of the improper or illegal practice; (2) the 
timeliness of the self-disclosure; (3) the cooperation in providing additional information related to 
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publish all settlements online to inform other actual or potential violators of the 
law.24 
When submitting a report pursuant to the SRDP, it is required that various 
complicated analyses are submitted along with it. The SRDP requires some 
simple information, such as the National Provider Information number, tax 
identification number, and the type of DHS provided.25 The SRDP also 
requires more complicated information including a legal analysis, financial 
analysis, financial relationship definitions, statements regarding the adequacy 
of any pre-existing compliance program, and a history of any similar 
violations.26 
The legal analysis requirement of the SRDP is to be presented as a 
statement from the disclosing party. Specifically, the disclosing party must 
write which Stark Law exception the provider was trying to meet, and why the 
provider failed to meet the exception.27 The disclosing party must break down 
the elements of the exception and explain which elements were met and which 
were not.28 Additionally, the disclosing party must provide an explanation for 
why they violated the law, whether it was a lack of compliance, intentional 
conduct, or changing corporate procedures.29 
The SRDP’s financial analysis requirement is slightly more ambiguous and 
difficult to complete than the legal analysis. The disclosing provider must 
define the “look-back” period in its financial analysis.30 To define the “look-
back” period the provider must identify the entire period of noncompliance and 
find the total dollar amount that is actually or potentially due to CMS.31 In 
addition to defining the “look-back” period, the provider must explain its 
rationale for defining such period, set forth the total amount of remuneration 
received in violation of the law, and a summary of any auditing activities.32 
 
the disclosure; (4) the litigation risk associated with the matter disclosed; and (5) the financial 
position of the disclosing party. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OMB CONTROL NO. 0930-1106, CMS 
VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL 3 (revised May 6, 2011) [hereinafter 
SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL]. 
 26. Id. at 4-5. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29.  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: 
VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL (Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS]. 
 30. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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Once instituted, CMS received many SRDP submissions from providers.33 
The volume of submissions created an administrative backlog and slow 
settlement turnarounds.34 In its statutorily mandated Report to Congress in 
2012, CMS reported that 150 submissions had been made with only fifteen 
resolved: six fully settled and nine withdrawn.35 Providers most-likely 
hesitated to self-disclose not knowing how generous CMS would be, or how 
similarly situated providers would be rewarded for self-disclosing. CMS 
publicized through its website the initial case settlements and any new 
disclosures.36 Since the initial backlog and a strongly worded letter from the 
lead author of Section 6409 of the ACA,37 CMS began to catch up on its 
settlement proceedings.38 
Despite some minor recent success, the SRDP still works much slower 
than the OIG Self-Disclosure Protocol, which typically produces a settlement 
agreement in a year or less.39 The slower turnaround time is somewhat 
puzzling since the OIG disclosure covers a wide array of violations, including 
Stark Law violations paired with other categories of fraudulent violations. The 
SRDP is limited exclusively to Stark Law violations.40 If a provider believes a 
Stark Law violation occurred with other non-Stark Law violations, CMS 
advises to use the OIG Self-Disclosure Protocol, not the SRDP.41 Therefore, 
OIG Self-Disclosure Protocol cannot include violations consisting solely of 
Stark Law violations. The slow turnaround for the SRDP exemplifies the truly 
complicated nature of Stark Law violations. 
 
 33.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDICARE SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL (Mar. 23, 2012) 
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE CONGRESS]. 
 34. Letter from Jim McDermott to Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator of Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter McDermott Letter] (highlighting the poor 
implementation of the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol and backlog of settlements occurring as a 
result of the poor implementation), available at http://op.bna.com/hl.nsf/id/stee-9ajr5w/$File/mc 
dermottstark.pdf. 
 35.  REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 33, at 10. 
 36.  Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Settlements, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (Feb. 9, 2014, 11:34 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelf 
Referral/Self-Referral-Disclosure-Protocol-Settlements.html. 
 37. McDermott Letter, supra note 34. 
 38. See Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Settlements, supra note 36 (settling three cases in 
2011, fourteen in 2012, and 24 in 2013); see also McDermott Letter, supra note 34. 
 39. See generally REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 33. 
 40. See SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 2; see also OIG 
PROTOCOL, supra note 19, at 4. 
 41.  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 29, at 6. 
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C. Section 6402 of the ACA: The 60-Day-Rule 
Submission of a report pursuant to the SRDP must be made in conjunction 
with other applicable laws, a feat more easily said than done. In Section 6402 
of the ACA, Congress created a deadline for returning overpayments.42 
Providers overpaid by a federal health care program must return the 
overpayment within sixty days of identification (hereinafter the “60-day-
rule”).43 Overpayments, as defined by CMS in its Proposed Rule, consist of 
any remuneration paid to a provider by Medicare (or any other federal health 
care program) where the provider discovers, after applicable reconciliation, it 
was not entitled to the payment.44 This includes payments to providers for 
services billed for but not rendered, double payment for a single service, or 
payment to a provider not in compliance with valid federal law (such as the 
Stark Law). Therefore, when a provider identifies she was not in compliance 
with the Stark Law, she must return the payment within sixty days. If payment 
is not returned in sixty days, she automatically violates the False Claims Act 
(FCA), creating exposure to a large array of additional penalties.45 
Along with the sixty-day time requirement, the violating provider must 
include a written report to be processed by the appropriate agency.46 The 
reporting requirement replaces an already existing reporting requirement in the 
CMS Medicare Financial Management Manual.47 The reporting requirement, 
for many purposes, serves as the only reporting the violating provider must do. 
For some violations, however, providers must also submit a self-disclosure to 
the appropriate agency to avoid additional penalties, such as the FCA or Civil 
Monetary Penalty Law.48 Submissions made to CMS using the SRDP must 
also include a written report of overpayment to the OIG to satisfy Section 6402 
of the ACA.49 
Due to the complicated nature of most Stark Law violations, it can take 
providers a long time to calculate the “look-back” period, or period of 
noncompliance, and the money paid by Medicare during that time. Therefore, 
it is very likely providers need more than sixty days to calculate and furnish 
 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)) (2012). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9180. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(3) (2012). 
 46. Many providers experience minor overpayments by a Medicare payment contractor and 
refund them automatically through their computer system. Providers are concerned that writing a 
report to CMS for every overpayment, no matter how minor, can be administratively costly and 
time consuming. CMS has yet to issue guidance on a threshold, but some jurisdictions have taken 
action to limit the amount of reports, like New York who set the threshold required to be met to 
write a report at $5,000 overpayment. See Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
 47. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9181. 
 48. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 29, at 3. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(1). 
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payment to CMS. Seeking to resolve this issue, CMS “pauses” the 60-day-rule 
upon receipt of the SRDP.50 While seemingly resolving the issue, CMS created 
many more legal issues for actual or potential Stark Law violators, which will 
be discussed further in this paper. 
So far, there have been no reported instances of the OIG enforcing the 60-
day-rule. It is likely that the OIG will wait until CMS’ Final Rule on the 60-
day-rule is issued before engaging in any enforcement. In its revised version of 
the Self-Disclosure Protocol published in April of 2013, the OIG states it will 
address how the 60-day-rule will affect its Self-Disclosure Protocol after CMS 
issues a final rule on the matter.51 However, delayed enforcement does not 
address the legal problems engrained in the statutory language. 
Following publication of the Proposed Rule to the 60-day-rule in February 
2012, many providers worried about how the rule would affect them. The 
American Hospital Association (AHA) described the law and its proposed 
rules as another “confusing, onerous, and legally risky set of expectations.”52 
Section 6402 of the ACA starts the clock when the provider “identifies” the 
overpayment.53 “Identifies” is defined by CMS as having actual knowledge or 
having no knowledge due to deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard.54 The 
standard presents potential legal issues for providers and what the AHA calls a 
“diversion of resources” towards compliance departments and educational 
programs to ensure legal execution of health care services under the 
“unreasonable and often impossible timeframes.”55 
D. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) passed in 2009, 
amending an important government tool, the FCA.56 The FCA is a civil and 
criminal law that prevents the knowing submission of false or fraudulent 
claims to a federal health care program.57 Prior to 2009, there was an issue 
many called the “reverse false claims” problem.58 The problem was that 
smaller damages were imposed on a provider that submitted a claim the 
provider believed to be legal, but later discovered was a false claim. Doing a 
 
 50. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 29, at 4. 
 51.  OIG PROTOCOL, supra note 19, at 2. 
 52. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President Am. Hosp. Ass’n., to Marilyn Tavenner, 
Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter AHA Letter] 
available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2012/120416-cl-CMS60037-p.pdf. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d). 
 54. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9182. 
 55. AHA Letter, supra note 52, at 2. 
 56. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 16. 
 57. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
 58. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 16 
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cost-benefit analysis would lead the provider not to disclose the false claim, 
because even if it was discovered later, the smaller damage would apply. 
FERA included an amendment to the FCA that extended the same 
penalties to any provider who knowingly retained payment to which it was not 
entitled.59 Therefore, a provider was liable for just as many damages if it 
knowingly submitted a false claim as if it discovered after the submission it 
was a false claim and did not come forward to remedy the situation. FERA also 
increased HHS’ authority to investigate various forms of fraud and abuse, 
increasing the likelihood that violating providers that do not voluntarily self-
disclose are caught.60 
III.  STARK LAW VIOLATION ROADMAP 
Stark Law violations occur in many circumstances. Many times the 
provider commits the violation unknowingly due to the complicated nature of 
the law. For example, a physician is in violation of the Stark Law if a lease and 
subsequent holdover period expire on the physician’s office in a building 
owned by an entity to which the physician refers DHS.61 It is easy for a 
physician to forget to sign a new lease and let the previous lease carry over, but 
due to the strict liability of the Stark Law, the physician is in noncompliance. 
Applying CMS’ proposed definition of an overpayment, any payments made 
by Medicare to the physician during the period of the expired lease is 
considered an overpayment and subject to the 60-day-rule.62 A simple misstep 
by a provider could result in a violation of the Stark Law and consequently, 
subject the provider to the 60-day-rule, increasing the penalties and repayments 
to Medicare through the FCA.63 Therefore, application of the proper legal 
analysis is imperative when a violation or potential violation is discovered. 
A. Identification and Characterization of the Violation 
Violations, or potential violations, can manifest themselves in a wide 
variety of ways. For developed health systems, an existing compliance 
department may receive tips from its anonymous hotline. For physician offices, 
knowledge of a violation could be discovered in the course of legal assistance 
on an unrelated matter. When discovered, it is very important to ask a variety 
of questions to identify the issue and determine the severity of the violation 
and extent of the providers’ potential liability. 
 
 59. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9187. 
 60. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1622 (2009). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(1) (2012). 
 62. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9181. 
 63. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402, 124 Stat. 755 
(2010). 
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1. What Kind of Violation? Is the Violation Systemic or Singularly 
Occurring? 
One of the most important questions surrounding any potential Stark Law 
violation is whether the violation occurred on a systemic basis or as an isolated 
incident. A systemic violation does not necessarily mean higher penalties or 
larger liability, but the scope of the investigation can usually be determined 
based on the violation being systemic or singularly occurring. 
A common Stark Law violation occurs with arrangements claiming the 
Bona Fide Employment Exception.64 Often, hospitals hire a physician as an 
employee and have the physician sign an employment agreement. For the 
purposes of Stark, that physician now has a financial relationship with the 
hospital (i.e., the hospital is paying her a salary). Under the Bona Fide 
Employment Exception to Stark, that physician may make referrals to the 
hospital and entities owned by the hospital so long as the appropriate measures 
have been taken.65 Failure to meet the Stark Law exception occurs if it is 
determined that the agreed compensation amount was more than fair market 
value.66 If the hospital is large and has many employment agreements, asking 
whether the compensation arrangement is systemic can determine liability 
exposure. Many hospitals offer standard contracts that vary minimally for 
similarly situated positions, and it is very possible that the exposure to Stark 
Law penalties is not limited to just this physician’s arrangement. 
Understanding the violation, whether just a Stark Law violation or both a 
Stark Law and an AKS violation, is important for the self-disclosure process. 
Prior to 2009, providers reported Stark Law violations directly to the DOJ, to 
CMS through advisory opinions, and most often reported violations to the OIG 
following the Self-Disclosure Protocol.67 However, in an Open Letter from the 
Inspector General in 2009, the OIG narrowed its focus on matters just 
involving AKS and FCA issues.68 The OIG still accepts disclosure for Stark 
Law violations, but it must be paired with a “colorable violation” of the AKS 
or FCA.69 The Letter also set a minimum settlement amount required for self-
disclosure at $50,000.70 No such minimum is required for any Stark Law 
 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2). 
 65. Id. To meet the requirements of the exception, (A) the employment must be for 
identifiable services, (B) the amount paid to the physician must be consistent with fair market 
value of the services and does not take into account the volume or value of referrals, and (C) the 
employment must be pursuant to a commercially reasonable agreement. Id. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 67. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
 68.  DANIEL LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AN OPEN LETTER TO 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/Open 
Letter3-24-09.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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violation disclosure pursuant to the SRDP. A violator could jeopardize its 
settlement proceeding by incorrectly identifying the violation and incorrectly 
disclosing information to the wrong agency. 
2. When Was the Violation Identified? 
Identification of the violation seems like a straightforward issue; however, 
with the current complex system of compliance programs, nature of various 
physician arrangements, and myriad complex rules and regulations governing 
the Stark Law, pinpointing the date of identification of a Stark Law violation 
may not be simple. Understanding when the violation was identified is 
important, especially with the presence of Section 6402 of the ACA: the 60-
day-rule.71 Some Stark Law violations, in the knowing or intentional manner 
they are violated, implicate violations of the FCA on their own.72 However, 
with the implication of Section 6402 of the ACA, any overpayment held past 
sixty days of identification automatically violates the FCA and as noted above, 
results in larger penalties for the violating provider.73 
In the legal world, “identification” means many things and could result in 
potential noncompliance for lack of understanding. CMS, in an attempt to clear 
up any confusion, issued Proposed Rules, which defined identification as 
“knowing” or “knowingly” in the manner defined in the FCA.74 “Knowing” is 
defined in the FCA as: (1) actual knowledge of the information; (2) acting in 
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acting in 
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.75 By including 
provisions beyond actual knowledge, CMS hoped to give providers an 
“incentive to exercise reasonable diligence to determine whether an 
overpayment exists.”76 However, it put the onus on providers to adequately 
supervise their system to ensure compliance when no current guidance 
identifies adequate supervision. 
Identifying overpayment is simple for various forms of overpayments. If a 
physician accidentally double bills for services rendered and identifies it two 
weeks later, she has identified the overpayment and has sixty days to repay the 
government. This is generally done by automatic payment through the 
electronic payment system set up with the physician and Medicare 
 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2013). 
 72. See generally U.S. ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey Healthcare Sys., Inc., 675 F.3d 394 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 73. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2013). Specifically, violation of the False Claims Act can result 
in payment of three times what the overpayment owed to the government is, as well as civil 
monetary penalties. Id. 
 74. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9182. 
 75. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). 
 76. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9182. 
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Administrative Contractor (MAC).77 Identification becomes much more 
difficult involving Stark Law violations. A Stark Law violation that lasts for 
one month could impose liability for each of the billed Medicare beneficiaries 
the physician saw in that month. That one month of noncompliance is 
considered by CMS as the “look-back” period, mentioned above.78 Going back 
and calculating all payments made by Medicare for one month could prove 
both costly in dollars and time and often cannot be done in the sixty day 
window. The “look-back” period, set by CMS in its Proposed Rule, can go 
back as far as ten years.79 Because providers cannot risk owing ten years worth 
of FCA penalties, they must then diligently ensure that the “look-back” period 
for each particular violation does not extend back to that time, dramatically 
increasing the cost of compliance. 
Because clear guidance has not been issued on how the 60-day-rule will be 
applied to the Stark Law, legal discrepancies exist for providers that affect 
liability. Identification of a Stark Law violation occurs after a provider is 
notified or discovers a potential violation and conducts a reasonable inquiry.80 
How CMS defines a reasonable inquiry is still unknown to providers. A 
provider does not know when the 60-day-rule begins throughout its 
investigation process. It is also unclear if the rule applies to any related 
violations, or to the full extent of the “look-back” period discovered after 
investigation. 
An alternative method of interpretation is the 60-day-rule starts over for 
each material piece of information discovered, information that changes the 
severity of the liability. For example, if a provider identifies a Stark Law 
violation and believes the “look-back” period is only for the month of May, 
applying the language of the statute, it follows that the 60-day-rule begins upon 
that discovery. However, if the provider discovers after thirty days of 
investigation that the actual “look-back” period also included March and April, 
does the rule’s clock start over altogether, do the new months of payments get 
added to the already existing clock, or does a second clock begin for March 
and April while the May clock still runs? It is possible providers could be 
required to pay Medicare for overpayments in reverse chronological order, 
depending on how CMS applies the language in the statute. Also, providers are 
unsure of when to disclose because CMS could interpret the reasonable inquiry 
to start the clock after the discovery of the May violation, where the provider 
believes it starts after the full investigation. 
 
 77. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
 78. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 6. 
 79. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9187. 
 80. Id. at 9182. 
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CMS aims to incentivize providers to exercise reasonable diligence in 
determining whether an overpayment or Stark Law violation occurred.81 
Without defining diligent (or reasonable inquiry), providers could incur large, 
unnecessary costs. A cautious institutional provider could incur large costs by 
investing large amounts of capital into an oversized compliance department as 
opposed to more targeted services that could increase efficient, high quality 
care. Would having any compliance department satisfy the diligence standard 
set by CMS or does the department need to be a certain size based on some 
quantifiable factor such as how many beds the institution has? Cautious 
providers of all sizes could end up incurring large legal costs over issues not 
necessarily needing outside legal counsel. On the other hand, a risk-taking 
institution may not invest in a large compliance department and just do what it 
believes to be an adequate job, but potentially incur large penalties due to a 
lack of diligence. CMS will not penalize with FCA penalties for expiration of 
the 60-day-rule when no identification occurs because of mere negligence,82 
but without clear guidance on how reckless disregard and deliberate ignorance 
standards apply to Stark Law cases, providers could be on the hook for very 
large penalties. 
Working in concert with the 60-day-rule and identification of a violation is 
FERA. The extent of FERA’s broadness lies with the broadness of the FCA’s 
definition of “knowing” or “knowingly.”83 Congress sought to improve 
enforcement for the recovery of funds lost to frauds related to federal 
assistance programs and relief programs, such as Medicare.84 In doing so, 
Congress amended the FCA and made it a violation to knowingly retain funds 
not properly obtained from the Medicare program and granted greater 
authorization for investigating potential fraud.85 It seems as though FERA’s 
battle against reverse false claims makes illegal any retention of overpayments, 
even those that fall within the 60-day-rule, but this will be addressed in Section 
IV of this paper. 
3. Can the Provider Calculate the Overpayment in 60 Days? 
While briefly touched on in the previous section, whether overpayment can 
be calculated in sixty days is very important in determining the course of 
remedial action. As previously mentioned, some fraud and abuse issues can be 
resolved very quickly. Providers can easily calculate the difference in 
overpayment in simple situations such as when a provider enters an incorrect 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Chananie et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
 83. See generally Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1616 
(2009). 
 84. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act § 4(a)(1). 
 85. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act § 4(b)(1). 
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code for a singular incident. The overpayment is just the difference in payment 
of the appropriate code from the entered code. Stark Law problems are 
generally larger, more complex, and more difficult to sort out. To resolve that 
issue, Congress created the SRDP, which contains a pause button for the 60-
day-rule. Once an SRDP is electronically submitted, the 60-day-rule is 
suspended and the provider is not in violation of the FCA and has as much 
time as necessary to settle with CMS.86 The provider goes through the 
procedure set forth by CMS to settle any overpayments and potential penalties 
for its violation. 
B. Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol and the Remedial Process 
When a provider determines that it may or may not have committed a 
violation and needs to take remedial action, there are various ways the provider 
may do so. One way is through a process established long before the institution 
of the SRDP. If a provider believes that its action could constitute a violation, 
it can submit a request for an advisory opinion pursuant to 42 C.F.R. §§ 
411.370 through 411.389.87 However, the advisory opinion process does not 
pertain to providers who are looking for answers regarding what fair market 
value is (a concept included in most Stark Law exceptions) and other aspects 
of specific exceptions.88 As mentioned in Section II, however, the advisory 
opinions can take a long time and do not always yield desirable results. 
The SRDP was created to fill the void the advisory opinions created. In 
fact, in the SRDP publication, CMS clearly states that providers may not file 
both an SRDP and an advisory opinion simultaneously.89 Providers are 
incentivized to participate in the voluntary self-disclosure process with the 
reduction of payment provision90 and the anticipated amount paid out for 
similarly situated providers freely available to the public.91 While the 
intentions are good, Congress left too much for CMS to define and the clarity 
that the SRDP was supposed to bring now creates larger clouds of confusion. 
One particular area of confusion surrounds criminal liability. If a provider 
deems itself a violator of a colorable AKS offense, it may participate in the 
OIG’s Self-Disclosure Protocol.92 Participation in that self-disclosure results in 
collaboration between the OIG and the DOJ, which often results in waiver of 
criminal liability, or, at the very least, a clearer understanding of potential 
 
 86. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 1. 
 87. 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.370-411.389 (2014). 
 88. 42 C.F.R. § 411.370(c). 
 89. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 1. 
 90. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6409(b), 124 Stat. 
722-723 (2010). 
 91. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6409(a)(2). 
 92. LEVINSON, supra note 68. 
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criminal liability. The OIG and DOJ work together and, if any unanticipated 
discoveries arise, they are handled accordingly. 
The SRDP process does not contain a waiver of criminal liability. In fact, 
while the SRDP is specific to the Stark Law, CMS does not guarantee that the 
disclosure is not turned over to the DOJ for criminal prosecution.93 The 
investigative process undertaken by CMS is not as closely connected to the 
DOJ’s work and so potential criminal investigation is a strong consideration 
for a provider deciding whether or not to submit a disclosure pursuant to the 
SRDP or the OIG’s Self-Disclosure Protocol. Also, because the disclosure 
processes between the OIG and CMS differ regarding AKS disclosure and 
Stark Law disclosure, it is possible the government could receive multiple 
overpayments by way of multiple disclosures.94 While CMS recommends that 
the provider identify any additional disclosures in its SRDP,95 the 
recommendation could fall on deaf ears and the uncertain provider could self-
disclose to multiple agencies. 
The settlement procedure has taken CMS longer than anticipated, 
potentially creating more hesitancy in self-disclosing to CMS. OIG set a one-
year deadline for reaching settlement agreements pursuant to its Self-
Disclosure Protocol.96 Out of hundreds of submissions to the SRDP since 
2010, only thirty-nine settlement agreements have been published on CMS’ 
website.97 CMS sped up the process of review, settling only seventeen cases in 
the first two years of establishment and twenty-two in the last year.98 The sped 
up process, however, still gives providers an inadequate amount of information 
to make an informed decision as to its own self-disclosure process. The 
published cases on CMS’ website vaguely identify what kind of provider and 
what Stark Law provision were in violation.99 
The SRDP gives no indication as to how much liability a provider could 
incur, and only mildly assists a provider in determining if it should report using 
SRDP, which itself is not a clear process. The government generally just wants 
the overpayment to be returned. Therefore it is not always necessary to inform 
the “correct” agency. But which agency is chosen could affect how much the 
payment is reduced in the settlement process, what additional penalties could 
occur, and how efficient the process is. Therefore, for each potential violation, 
the provider should carefully assess which agency will provide the best 
opportunity for favorable outcomes. 
 
 93. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 3. 
 94. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 29, at 7. 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. OIG PROTOCOL, supra note 19. 
 97. Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Settlements, supra note 36. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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If the provider believes that it is in violation of the AKS, it should most 
likely submit its disclosure to the OIG. The OIG will work in concert with the 
DOJ to work out any potential criminal charges. If it is solely a Stark Law 
violation, submitting an SRDP would generally best suit the provider. CMS 
has not historically worked as closely with the DOJ, so there are instances 
when a provider may want to report directly to the DOJ for a strictly Stark Law 
violation if criminal charges are likely.100 Often, providers or counsel will have 
working relationships with U.S. Attorneys in their region and know what to 
expect in a disclosure process if they choose to work out the disclosure with 
that U.S. Attorney. 
As part of the SRDP, the provider must submit a full financial and legal 
analysis of why it violated the Stark Law.101 A cause of the delay in settlement 
proceedings has been that many of the disclosures by providers have not 
included an adequate enough financial analysis.102 A legal analysis means that 
the provider must submit detailed information regarding the Stark Law 
exception it aimed to meet, and why the provider failed to meet that exception 
in an element-by-element break down.103 
One explanation for the inadequate financial analyses is that providers 
believed they adequately provided the right financial information but 
misunderstood how much was required. In this instance, the providers 
voluntarily submitted legal analysis of why they did not meet the Stark Law 
without the understanding of how much information they would be required to 
report. At first glance, it looks as if providers were making decisions to 
voluntarily report without knowing their full potential liability. This has almost 
no impact on providers whose situations are clear-cut violations. But for 
providers who are reporting a potential violation, their initial financial analysis 
could result in serious miscalculations of liability prior to submission. Of 
course, the submission may be withdrawn,104 but it is likely the potential for 
CMS investigation or audit procedures under FERA could rise significantly 
and the provider flagged itself as an audit target. 
Another possibility surrounding the number of reports with inadequate 
financial analyses revisits issues with the 60-day-rule. One possible reason 
many disclosures have inadequate financial analysis is that providers are 
scared they will be in violation of the 60-day-rule and prematurely report. 
Providers may look at their financial situation, specifically the “look-back” 
period, and with the sixty-day time limit approaching any FCA liability would 
significantly increase their potential liability. Providers would submit the 
 
 100. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 3. 
 101. Id. at 5. 
 102. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 33, at 8-9. 
 103. SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 25, at 4. 
 104. Id. at 5. 
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electronic SRDP with as much financial information as they have and pause 
the 60-day-rule. The fear is that the providers did not move with enough 
“deliberate speed” and did not make a reasonable enough inquiry.105 At the 
time of submission the violation might not be colorable and therefore the 
providers submitted a voluntary self-disclosure prematurely. If not under the 
pressure of the 60-day-rule, the providers could have made the reasonable 
inquiry without the added pressure and discovered they did not need to submit. 
At that point, the providers would withdraw their SRDP but like the previous 
scenario, the providers may unnecessarily put themselves on CMS’ list for 
potential future audits. 
IV.  WHY CONGRESS AND CMS SHOULD CHANGE THE REPORTING AND 
DISCLOSURE RULES AND PROVIDERS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS IN SELF-
DISCLOSING UNTIL IT DOES 
Congress aimed to crackdown on fraud and abuse on the Medicare system 
and to make a clear avenue for self-reporting by providers in the recent health 
care law changes. By implementing the SRDP, strengthening FERA’s 
investigative powers, and implementing the 60-day-rule, Congress gave CMS 
the upper hand in fraud and abuse prosecution. However, Congress also put 
providers in a predicament that could result in outcomes less desirable than 
intended. A few of the ultimate goals of the ACA were to reduce fraud and 
abuse, recover money that CMS paid to providers not entitled, and to improve 
the quality of care of the Medicare beneficiaries. The problems presented to 
providers through these particular provisions of the ACA and guidance issued, 
create a cloud of confusion surrounding the self-reporting process. 
The legal determination for how the 60-day-rule applies to Stark Law 
violations, or lack of one, is insufficient in providing the guidance necessary to 
make an informed decision about self-disclosure. CMS proposes that if, after 
applicable reconciliation, the provider identifies overpayment, it is to report 
that overpayment. According to the commentary, if a report has already been 
made on the initial discovery, an additional report should be made to the 
appropriate agency as a separate self-disclosure, only referencing its 
connection to the first report.106 Providers, out of fear of violating the 60-day-
rule, will report a simple overpayment to the OIG through Section 6402, and 
continue to conduct their reasonable inquiry. Providers may discover a self-
referral violation in connection to the original overpayment report and file a 
subsequent SRDP with CMS. 
 
 105. Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 9182. 
 106. Id. at 9184. Language of the commentary implies that HHS wants to shy away from 
“supplemental” reports to the initial report. Id. CMS most likely does not want providers 
submitting initial reports to OIG covering the bare bones requirements and then supplementing 
these reports with the actual information causing review of the report twice. 
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The confusion not only makes decisions difficult for providers in how to 
best resolve any actual or potential violations, it creates inefficiencies for all 
parties. From the government’s perspective, there is potential that double or 
even triple review for the same violation could occur. The 60-day-rule applies 
pressure to the provider to disclose before ready. The pressure could force 
providers to disclose the overpayment or violation to the wrong agency. In its 
Report to Congress, CMS stated that it would work in concert with the other 
agencies (namely OIG and DOJ) to resolve issues.107 However, submissions 
that would not normally be reviewed by all three agencies could potentially be 
reviewed by all three because of the providers’ fear of violation of the 60-day-
rule. 
From the provider’s perspective, the increased enforcement could actually 
slow down the reporting process. Congress aimed to create an avenue that 
helped resolve Stark Law violations in a much clearer manner. The avenue it 
created, passed in conjunction with FERA and the 60-day-rule, makes it harder 
for providers to figure out where to report. As mentioned previously, providers 
may have to submit multiple disclosures for one violation if they prematurely 
report and discover more about the violation. Additionally, in order to meet the 
reasonable inquiry standard, providers may take more time forming 
compliance departments or seeking assistance of legal counsel for some 
violations or overpayments when simple reporting via Section 6402 would 
suffice. 
One issue not addressed yet is how the health care law puts a heavy burden 
on institutional providers. According to the Report to Congress, of the first 150 
submissions using the SRDP, 125 of the submissions were from hospitals.108 
Of course, hospitals generally have the money to start, or already have 
institutional compliance departments, and catching violations is generally 
easier. Additionally, hospitals contain a high concentration of physicians and 
other providers in one area and hold the upper hand (and often reporting 
responsibility) in contracts with outside physicians. 
If one goal of adding FERA, the SRDP, and 60-day-rule is to increase 
quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries, a large number of providers are 
falling out of the spotlight. A recent study conducted by the American Medical 
Association (AMA) found that 53.5 percent of physicians surveyed were self-
employed, twenty-three percent worked in practices at least partly owned by a 
hospital, and only 5.6 percent of respondents stated they were hospital 
employees.109 It would be inappropriate to directly correlate the AMA study 
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percentages to the number of SRDPs because often hospitals have a more 
complicated series of arrangements, trying to meet more Stark Law exceptions. 
Hospitals generally have a larger dependence on Medicare payment and so 
even if over half of physicians are in private practice, many of those practices 
could be in specialties that do not require Medicare payment (i.e., pediatrics, 
elective plastic surgery) and some of them may choose not to take Medicare 
payment at all. But it cannot be ignored that the new rules, the same rules 
forcing hospitals to beef up their compliance departments, put a heavier burden 
on institutional providers. 
The AHA, in their strongly worded comments to CMS regarding the 
Proposed Rule on overpayments in February 2012, reiterates this exact point. 
The AHA identifies the provisions calling for reasonable inquiry (or “duty to 
investigate”) and extension of the “look-back” period to ten years the “two 
most concerning aspects of the proposed rule.”110 The AHA argues that 
hanging ten years of FCA violations over the head of an institutional provider 
creates an impossible standard where a hospital “would effectively have to 
guarantee that its bills and reviews were 100 percent accurate 100 percent of 
the time.”111 In addition to accuracy, the AHA argues that the Proposed Rule 
puts too strong an emphasis on speed, stating that sixty days to return an 
overpayment is an unreasonable amount of time with large institutions and 
allows for meritless cases to be brought by whistleblowers within the 
institution on the premise that the hospital should have known of the 
overpayment sooner.112 The AHA reiterates the point made earlier in this paper 
that a focus is put on institutions and their compliance departments and such a 
focus minimizes their already good faith efforts to comply with various 
regulations and puts a near impossible burden on them.113 
The heavy burden on institutional providers could have many unintended 
consequences hurting the aims of the health care laws. For a savvy private 
practice physician wanting to ensure a compliant provision of care to patients, 
the additional burdens (and resulting legal and administrative expenses) could 
discourage the physician from renewing her Medicare Participating Provider 
Agreement. A decline in Medicare reimbursement in general combined with 
the number of expenses (even if no violations are discovered) added would 
make moving to only commercial payors a potentially smart business move. 
 
EMPLOYMENT 8 (2013), available at https://download.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/health-policy/ 
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The implementation of the rules as they stand could add to the existing 
problem of physicians retreating from Medicare.114 
As a solution to the large problems of the overlap of FERA, the SRDP, and 
60-day-rule, CMS should only apply the 60-day-rule to a category of 
overpayments titled “simple overpayments.” CMS defines any money paid to a 
provider that, after applicable reconciliation, the provider is not entitled to as 
an “overpayment” for the purposes of the 60-day-rule.115 An exception should 
be created for Stark Law and AKS violations thereby creating the 
overpayments required to comply with the 60-day-rule as “simple 
overpayments.” The “simple overpayments” include examples already given 
by CMS such as: (1) when a provider reviews payment records and discovers 
one was incorrectly coded; (2) discovery that patient death occurred prior to a 
submitted bill for services; and (3) services billed for were conducted by an 
unlicensed professional.116 These suggestions are just to give an idea of what a 
“simple overpayment” would entail and is not an exhaustive list. The key point 
is that “simple overpayments” do not include violations of the Stark Law and 
AKS and include those that can be discovered fairly quickly and remediated 
easily. 
As expressed previously in this paper, the government currently has an 
overlap of laws. One discussed in less detail is the overlap of FERA provisions 
and the 60-day-rule. The FERA provision makes changes to the FCA stating 
that if a provider knowingly retains an overpayment, it is an FCA violation.117 
The 60-day-rule holds that once an overpayment is identified, the provider has 
sixty days to return the overpayment.118 Technically, during those sixty days 
(or until the provider returns the overpayment) the provider is knowingly 
retaining the overpayment, violating FERA. The OIG is not likely to enforce 
FERA this way because such an interpretation would make the 60-day-rule 
moot and would extend FERA beyond the scope intended. Both FERA and the 
60-day-rule impose FCA violations to previously unaffected overpayments or 
violations. 
Defining overpayment for the purposes of the 60-day-rule as a “simple 
overpayment” would ease the burden placed on providers and the government 
would still accomplish its fraud and abuse goals. Providers’ burden would ease 
by removing the seemingly arbitrary sixty day deadline acting like a gun to 
their heads. Providers would not be bound by the “duty to investigate” or 
reasonable inquiry standards with the sixty day deadline approaching. Of 
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course, the same “knowing” standard applies to FERA and so providers would 
need to ensure that their retention of overpayments was not made with 
deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard. Congress could accomplish its fraud 
and abuse goals by using FERA to replace the FCA penalties on providers who 
knowingly retain overpayments in cases where the FCA penalties would be 
removed with the 60-day-rule. The point of adding the FCA violations was to 
incentivize providers to remain accountable for what they bill for and how they 
conduct business. That point is not lost in removing the 60-day-rule for Stark 
Law and AKS violations because providers would still need to ensure they do 
not hide behind ignorance or reckless disregard without the threat of FCA 
violations. It just gives providers the room necessary to operate their 
compliance programs and confer with legal counsel without the frantic aspects 
of the 60-day-rule. 
Removing the 60-day-rule’s application to the Stark Law and AKS will 
ultimately result in more disclosures due to efficiencies in the system. 
Providers, in discovering an overpayment, will preliminarily identify the 
category of overpayment. If at first glance the overpayment looks like a 
“simple overpayment,” the provider will work to submit a report pursuant to 
Section 6402 to OIG and repay the overpayment within sixty days, most likely 
directly to the MAC. If, after further investigation, the provider realizes the 
overpayment was tied to a series of Stark Law violations, the provider will 
have as much time as necessary to investigate the violation and apply the 
appropriate financial and legal analysis without triggering the 60-day-rule. A 
more complete SRDP will be submitted to CMS and there will be less intra-
agency conferring because the report will be more complete. The complete 
report will result in less time waiting on document submission and quicker 
review turnaround time. Quicker turnaround time will result in more settlement 
postings and more faith in the system from providers that not only will their 
submissions result in reduction of payments, but they will be resolved quickly. 
Ultimately, the number of submissions will increase and the number of dollars 
recovered will increase. 
Problems will still exist with the system, but many of them will not change 
because of the nature of the Stark Law itself. There will still be situations 
where providers are unsure whether there is an AKS issue and a Stark Law 
issue, or if it is just one or the other. The providers will need to decide whether 
the SRDP or the OIG Self-Disclosure Protocol is appropriate. There will still 
also need to be an increase in compliance departments around the country for 
institutional and large group providers. Lack of adequate knowledge and 
investigation could result in FCA violations if no system for detecting and 
investigating potential overpayments and violations exists. However, by 
removing the 60-day-rule from the Stark Law and AKS analysis, a provider 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
210 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:189 
will not be held to the impossible standards of having “to guarantee that its 
bills and reviews were 100 percent accurate 100 percent of the time.”119 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Congress intended to create an open channel of communication between 
providers and CMS when it created the SRDP. Providers, feeling threatened to 
disclose potentially damaging information without knowing the outcome, can 
hinder that channel of communication. That channel of communication could 
be damaged by not addressing different problems in different manners. The 
Stark Law presents a unique problem that results in Medicare overpayments, as 
currently defined, that are much different than many other overpayments. 
Giving providers extra time to appropriately investigate their potential 
violations without the fear of FCA prosecutions will result in not only more 
disclosures, but more thorough disclosures. Because the disclosures will be 
more thorough, there will be less administrative time devoted by CMS in fact 
finding and information requests, resulting in quicker settlement turnarounds 
and fewer agency dollars spent in administrative review for each disclosure. 
CMS changing its definition of “overpayment” when publishing its Final 
Rule on the Section 6402 of the ACA would grant providers the necessary 
extra time. Overpayment should be defined as is in the Proposed Rule in 
February 2012, with a new exemption for Stark Law and AKS violations. This 
definition would apply the 60-day-rule only to “simple overpayments.” Any 
lost enforcement capabilities from the change in definition would be made up 
by FERA’s already existing “reverse false claim” provision prohibiting the 
knowing retention of payments the provider is not entitled to. 
Whether the Final Rule applies principles in the Proposed Rule or not, 
providers will need to increase their compliance departments. The impetus of 
potential FCA violations, which would apply through either FERA or the 60-
day-rule, is too large a concern to not address with added compliance 
programs. But if the 60-day-rule does not apply to Stark Law and AKS 
violations, providers will not be held to impossible standards of investigation. 
Providers will be able to adequately investigate and research violations so a 
more appropriate analysis can be applied and a more complete SRDP can be 
filed. Appropriate legal and financial analyses are key to a complete SRDP, 
which is key to successful communication between CMS and the disclosing 
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providers. Successful communication will benefit both the providers and the 
government and assist in accomplishing overarching societal goals of 
improving health care in the United States. 
PETER J. EGGERS 
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